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Fichte, Hegel, and the Life and Death Struggle 
James A. Clarke 
&KDSWHU ,9RI+HJHO¶VPhenomenology of Spirit opens with an account of self-consciousness that is 
recognizably Fichtean: self-FRQVFLRXVQHVVLVFKDUDFWHUL]HGDVWKHµPRWLRQOHVVWDXWRORJ\RI,DP,¶,Q
the attempt to sustain this motionless tautology, self-consciousness is transformed into the insatiable 
µDFWLYLW\¶RIµGHVLUH¶RUDSSHWLWH²Begierde. $VVHYHUDOFRPPHQWDWRUVKDYHQRWHG+HJHO¶VDFFRXQWRI
GHVLUH EHDUV D VWULNLQJ UHVHPEODQFH WR )LFKWH¶V DFFRXQW RI µVWULYLQJ¶ Streben) in his 1794/5 
Foundations of the entire Doctrine of Science and other works.1 $FFRUGLQJ WR )LFKWH µSUDFWLFDO
UHDVRQ¶GHPDQGV WKDWZHFRPSOHWHO\ VXERUGLQDWH WKH µQRW-,¶ RUZRUOG WR WKH µSXUH ,¶ RU UHDVRQ2 
Since we are finite rational beings²beings that are limited by, and dependent on, a not-I²we cannot 
hope to attain the goal that reason prescribes. (Fichte assumes that the attainment of this goal would 
eliminate the not-I.) Nevertheless, we can, and should, endlessly strive to attain it. This is our moral 
µvocation¶ (Bestimmung).3  
7KHUHFDQ,WKLQNEHOLWWOHGRXEWDVWRWKHFULWLFDOLQWHQWRI+HJHO¶VDFFRXQWRIGHVLUH+HJHO¶V
point, I take it, is that Fichtean moral agency is structurally identical to insatiable animal desire, and 
about as meaningless and frustrating. But if this is correct, it raises the question of whether the rest of 
Chapter IV can be construed as a critique of Fichte. More specifically, can the famous account of  
UHFRJQLWLRQZKLFKLVGHULYHGIURPGHVLUHEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVDFULWLTXHRI)LFKWH¶VSRVLWLRQ" 
In a recent paper, Paul Redding has answered these questions in the affirmative.4 +HJHO¶V
DFFRXQWRIWKHGLDOHFWLFRI0DVWHU\DQG6HUYLWXGHVKRXOGKHFODLPVEHUHDGDVDFULWLTXHRI)LFKWH¶V
position. Redding points out that Fichte presents his account of rHFRJQLWLRQDVDµVROXWLRQ¶WRSUREOHPV
inherent in his account of self-consciousness. Since Hegel presents his account of recognition in 
Chapter IV as a solution to problems inherent in a Fichtean conception of self-consciousness, it seems 
reasonable to asVXPH 5HGGLQJ DUJXHV WKDW WKDW DFFRXQW LV LQWHQGHG DV D FULWLTXH RI )LFKWH¶V
µDSSURDFK¶$FFRUGLQJ WR5HGGLQJ WKLVFULWLTXHFRQVLVWV LQ WKHFODLPWKDW)LFKWH¶VFRPPLWPHQW WRD
                                                          
1
 Beiser 2005: 178, 181. Solomon 1983: 434-5. Redding 2009. See EPS: §§424-9.  
2
 SK: 232. SW, I: 264. 
3
 See EPW: 145-153; SW, VI: 293-301; SET: 143. SW, IV: 150-1. 
4
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µGHVLUHPRGHORIFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶HQWDLOV²not mutual recognition²but the asymmetrical relationship 
of Mastery and Servitude. 
$OWKRXJK 5HGGLQJ¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV SODXVLEOH KH KDV OLWWOH WR VD\ DERXW D FUXFLDO VWDJH RI
Chapter IV: the life and death struggle. This is a shame for two reasons. First, one of the issues facing 
any interpretation of Chapter IV is how to make sense of the alleged necessity of the transition from 
the demand for recognition to the life and death struggle. Second, the life and death struggle seems to 
pose a serious problem for an interpretation of Chapter IV as an µimmanent critique¶5 RI )LFKWH¶V
DFFRXQW RI UHFRJQLWLRQ 7KLV LV EHFDXVH )LFKWH¶V DFFRXQW RI UHFRJQLWLRQ FRQFHLYHV RI PXWXDO
recognition as occurring without any interpersonal conflict, and seeks to eliminate the possibility of 
any such conflict. The lLIHDQGGHDWKVWUXJJOHLVDQLQQRYDWLRQRI+HJHO¶VDQGLWLVVRPHWLPHVFODLPHG
that it is inspired by his reading of Hobbes.6 ,IRQHLVWRLQWHUSUHW&KDSWHU,9DVDFULWLTXHRI)LFKWH¶V
account of recognition, then one has to explain why Hegel thinks that )LFKWH¶VDFFRXQWHQWDLOVDOLIH
and death struggle. 
The aim of this paper is to provide such an explanation. The first part provides a discussion of 
)LFKWH¶VDFFRXQWRIUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWHPSKDVL]HVLWVµHSLVWHPLF¶FRQFHUQV7KHVHFRQGSDUWprovides a 
reconVWUXFWLRQ RI WKH OLIH DQG GHDWK VWUXJJOH DV DQ LPPDQHQW FULWLTXH RI )LFKWH¶V DFFRXQW RI
recognition. It also attempts to VKHG OLJKW RQ D SX]]OH UHJDUGLQJ WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI +HJHO¶V
argument. Although this reconstruction will focus on the account of the life and death struggle in the 
Phenomenology, it will also draw upon the accounts provided in the Philosophical Propaedeutic and 
the Encyclopaedia.  
 
1 
1.1 A µVystem of freedom¶ 
)LFKWH¶VDFFRXQWRIUHFRJQLWLRQFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGDGHTXDWHO\RQO\LILWLVviewed in the context of his 
philosophical project. Consequently, a brief discussion of the nature of that project is necessary. 
                                                          
5
 I explain the concept of immanent critique in §2.1 below. 
6
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)LFKWH¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO SURMHFW LV WR FRQVWUXFW D V\VWHP RI WUDQVFHQGHQWDO SKLORVRSK\ WKDW
derives the apriori conditions of the possibility of every domain of human experience from a set of 
µILUVW SULQFLSOHV¶ Grundsätze )LFKWH¶V QDPH IRU WKLV V\VWHP²Doctrine of Science 
(Wissenschaftslehre)²PLJKWEH WDNHQ WR VXJJHVW DQDUURZSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWK LVVXHV LQ µWKHRUHWLFDO
SKLORVRSK\¶ Although Fichte is concerned with such issues, that concern is tributary to a fundamental 
FRQFHUQZLWKµSUDFWLFDOSKLORVRSK\¶DQGWKHQDWXUHRIKXPDQIUHHGRP,QGHHGLQDIDPRXVGUDIWRID
letter to Jens Baggesen (dated April or May 1795), Fichte describes the Doctrine of Science as the 
µILUVW V\VWHPRI IUHHGRP¶7 This system, Fichte claims, has accomplished a philosophical revolution 
WKDWSDUDOOHOVDQGFRPSOHPHQWVWKH)UHQFKUHYROXWLRQµ>7@KHILUVWSULQFLSOHRIP\V\VWHP¶KHZULWHV
by way of explanatiRQµSUHVHQWVPDQDVDVHOI-sufficient being [selbständiges Wesen].¶8  
 7KHILUVWSULQFLSOHRI)LFKWH¶VV\VWHPDVIRUPXODWHGLQWKHFoundations of the entire 
Doctrine of Science) LV µ7KH ,RULJLQDOO\DQGDEVROXWHO\SRVLWV LWVRZQH[LVWHQFH¶9 This principle²
ZKLFK LV HTXLYDOHQW WR µ,   ,¶ RU µ, DP ,¶²LV LQWHQGHG WR H[SUHVV WKH µVHOI-SRVLWLQJ¶ DFWLYLW\ RI WKH
µDEVROXWH¶RUµSXUH,¶7KHSXUH,LQVRIDUDVLWLVLQWHOOLJLEOHWRXVLVDVHOI-conscious, completely free 
activity that has no bounds or limits. Fichte attempts to capture the complete freedom of the pure I 
ZLWK WHUPVVXFKDVµVHOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQ¶ Selbstbestimmung µVHOI-VXIILFLHQF\¶ Selbständigkeit), and 
µLQGHSHQGHQFH¶ Unabhängigkeit). These terms function as synonyms or near-synonyms for 
µIUHHGRP¶ 
7RVD\WKDWWKHSXUH, LVFRPSOHWHO\µVHOI-GHWHUPLQLQJ¶LV WRVD\WKDWDQ\µGHWHUPLQDWLRQV¶²
any properties or characteristics²that it possesses are determined by itself alone. It is also to say that 
it is not constrained to determine itself in any particular way (self-determination is not the realization 
RIDIL[HGµHVVHQFH¶RUµQDWXUH¶)LFKWHFRQFHLYHVRIVHOI-GHWHUPLQDWLRQDVWKH,¶VOLPLWOHVVFDSDFLW\WR
shape and re-VKDSH LWVHOIDQGKHGHILQHVIUHHGRP LQ WKLVFRQWH[WDV WKHSXUH ,¶V µDEVROute power to 
make itself absolutely¶.10 An important implication of this claim (which will play a crucial role in 
+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHLVWKDWWKHSXUH,LVIXQGDPHQWDOO\µLQGHWHUPLQDWH¶unbestimmt,IWKH,FDQµPDNH
                                                          
7
 GA, III, 2: 298. EPW: 385-6.  
8
 GA, III, 2: 298. EPW: 385. Translation modified. 
9
 SW, I: 98. SK: 99. Translation modified. 
10
 SET: 37. SW, IV: 32. 
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LWVHOI DEVROXWHO\¶²LI LW FDQ µFKRRVH¶ WKe determinations that it possesses²then that choice must be 
unconstrained: the pure I cannot possess any determinations that would compel or necessitate it to 
determine itself in a particular way. As Fichte puts it in the 1798 The System of Ethics, the self, qua 
SXUH,µRULJLQDOO\>«@is DEVROXWHO\QRWKLQJ¶11  
7KH ILUVW SULQFLSOH RI )LFKWH¶V µV\VWHP RI IUHHGRP¶ SUHVHQWV µPDQ¶ DV D FRPSOHWHO\ µVHOI-
VXIILFLHQW¶, and therefore completely free, EHLQJ+RZHYHU)LFKWH¶VV\VWHPGRHVQRWFRQFHLYHRIWKH
human being solely in such terms. Fichte maintains that the human being is a finite rational being or 
µLQGLYLGXDO¶DEHLQJLQZKLFKWKHDFWLYLW\RIWKHSXUH,LVOLPLWHGDQGFRQVWUDLQHGE\DµQRW-I¶RUZRUOG
7KLV OLPLWDWLRQ WUDQVIRUPV WKH DFWLYLW\ RI WKH SXUH , LQWR D µVWULYLQJ¶ WKH SXUH , LPSHOV WKH ILQLWH
rational being to abolish the limitation of the not-I and to attain absolute self-sufficiency. The finite 
rational being cannot attain such a goal, since it would cease to be a finite rational being. Nevertheless 
it can strive to attain this goal, and has a moral GXW\WRGRVR7KLVLVLWVPRUDOµYRFDWLRQ¶ 
 
1.2 The problem of recognition 
As he developed his system of freedom, Fichte encountered a problem which he believed to threaten 
the coherence of the Critical enterprise (i.e., Kantian philosophy). The problem arises from a 
consideration of the epistemological presuppositions of Kantian moral and political theory. (For the 
sake of simplicity, I will focus on the former.) Kantian moral theory holds that the moral law 
FRPPDQGVXVWRWUHDWµUDWLRQDOEHLQJV¶DVµHQGVLQWKHPVHOYHV¶QHYHUPHUHO\DVPHDQV,WDOVRKROGV
that we have different obligations towards rational and non-rational beings: I have an unconditional 
duty to treat rational beings as ends in themselves, etc., but no such duty to so treat non-rational 
beings. For the moral law to be applied, and therefore obeyed, we must be able to pick out and 
identify rational beings like ourselves. Now, as Fichte points out, such identification is part of our 
everyday moral practice, and we possess publicly shared criteria which, we assume, allow us to do 
this.12 However, it is conceivable that our identification of rational beings is systematically mistaken. 
If that is so, then a whole class of actions that we take to be permitted by the moral law might in fact 
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 SET: 52-3. SW, IV: 50. See also FNR: 74.  
12
 See Fichte to Reinhold, 29th August, 1795. EPW: 408. 
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violate it. Thus our treatment of animals might violate the moral law, although that treatment is 
µVXSSRUWHG E\ JHQHUDO RSLQLRQ¶13 To exclude this possibility, we need to justify our attribution of 
rationality to other beings. Absenting such a justification, the moral law µKDV QR DSSOLFDELOLW\ RU
UHDOLW\¶14  
The problem that Critical philosophy faces, then, is an epistemic one: how to justify our 
attribution of rationality to other beings. (We would now refer to this problem under the rubric of µthe 
SUREOHPRIRWKHUPLQGV¶) This problem seems to be a serious one for transcendental idealism, for it 
holds that the properties in virtue of which rational beings are rational²reason and freedom²are 
µLQWHOOLJLEOH¶RU µQRXPHQDO¶ DQG WKHUHIRUH FDQQRWEHJLYHQ LQ experience. Thus Kant asserts, in the 
first Critique WKDW , µFDQQRW KDYH WKH OHDVW UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ RI D WKLQNLQJ EHLQJ WKURXJK DQ H[WHUQDO
experience, but only through self-FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶15 In his 1794 Some Lectures concerning the 
6FKRODU¶V9RFDWLRQ, Fichte claims that freedom²our radical capacity for self-determination²cannot 
be given directly in outer or inner experience.16 Given such statements, it is not clear what would 
justify our ascription of rationality to other beings.  
)LFKWH¶V ILUVW IXOO VWDWHPHQW RI WKH SUREOHP RFcurs in the second of the lectures just cited. 
Fichte formulates the problem as a question: 
 
How does a man come to assume that there are rational beings like himself apart from him, and 
how does he come to recognize [anzuerkennen] them, since such beings are certainly not 
immediately given in his pure self-consciousness?17  
 
This question contains two interrelated TXHVWLRQV7KHILUVWDVNVKRZZHFRPHWRµDVVXPH¶WKDWWKHUH
are other rational beings like ourselves since the properties in virtue of which they are rational²
reason and freedom²FDQQRWEHJLYHQLQH[SHULHQFH$V)LFKWH¶VVXEVHTXHQWGLVFXVVLRQPDNHVFOHDU
this first question asks for more than just an account of how we come to acquire the relevant belief; it 
                                                          
13
 EPW: 408. 
14
 FNR: 75. SW, III: 81. 
15
 Kant 1997: A347/B405. See also A357-8. 
16
 EPW: 155. SW, VI: 305. 
17
 EPW: 153. Translation modified. SW, VI: 302.  
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also asks for a justification of that process of acquisition. Thus, it would not be answered satisfactorily 
by simply claiming²as Kant does in the first Critique²WKDW ZH µWUDQVIHU¶ RXU FRQFHSW RI VHOI-
consciousness onto certain phenomena.18 :H DOVR QHHG WR VKRZ WKDW VXFK D µWUDQVIHUHQFH¶ LV
justified.19 The second question is more specific. It asks how we come to pick out and identify²
µUHFRJQL]H¶²UDWLRQDO EHLQJV VLQFH WKH\ FDQQRW EH JLYHQ LQ H[SHULHQFH $V )LFKWH¶V VXEVHTXHQW
GLVFXVVLRQPDNHVFOHDUWKLVTXHVWLRQDVNVIRUFULWHULDRUµFKDUDFWHULVWLFIHDWXUHV¶ which would enable 
XVWRµUHFRJQL]H¶RWKHUUDWLRQDOEHLQJVZLWKFHUWDLQW\20  This, it should be noted, is the first occurrence 
RIµUHFRJQLWLRQ¶DVDWHFKQLFDOWHUPLQ)LFKWH¶VSKLORVRSK\ 
 In several writings from the Jena period, Fichte criticizes Kant for failing to answer these 
questions.21 Indeed, in the 1796/99 Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo he complains that this failure 
FRQVWLWXWHV WKH µPRVW VWULNLQJ GHPRQVWUDWLRQ RI WKH LQFRPSOHWHQHVV RI .DQW¶V &ULWLFDO SKLORVRSK\¶22 
However, he notes that Kant came close to answering these questions in his Critique of the Power of 
Judgment.23 )ROORZLQJ .DQW¶V OHDG )LFKWH¶V RZQ DQVZHU WR WKHVH TXHVWLRQV UHOLHV RQ WKH QRWLRQ RI
µUHIOHFWLQJMXGJHPHQW¶24 )LFKWH¶VDQVZHUVLPSO\SXWLVWKDWDPRQJWKHShenomena that I must think 
under the concept of purposiveness, there are some that I can comprehend adequately only by 
transferring my concepts of reason and freedom to them. According to Fichte, the necessity of this 
transference confers certainty on the resultant judgement and justifies it. Those features of the 
SKHQRPHQD WKDWSURPSW WKLV LQIHUHQWLDOSURFHVVFRQVWLWXWH µFHUWDLQDQGQRQGHFHSWLYH¶ µGLVWLQJXLVKLQJ
IHDWXUHV¶RUµFULWHULD¶WKDWDOORZXVWRUHFRJQL]HUDWLRQDOEHLQJVOLNHRXUVHOYHV25  
 Fichte thHUHIRUH LQWURGXFHV WKH WHUP µUHFRJQLWLRQ¶ Anerkennung) in the context of an 
epistemic SUREOHP ,Q WKLV FRQWH[W µAnerkennung¶ GHQRWHV ZKDW ZH PLJKW FDOO µHSLVWHPLF¶ RU
                                                          
18
 Kant 1997: A345-347/B 404-405. Fischbach 1999: 17-19. Radrizzani 1985: 58-9.   
19
 EPW: 154. SW, VI: 303. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 See EPW: 407-9; FNR: 75. SW, III: 80-1. 
22
 Fichte 1992: 303. 
23
 Ibid )LFKWH KDV LQ PLQG .DQW¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH KH[DJRQ GUDZQ LQ WKH VDQG See Kant 2000: §64. For 
discussion, see Fischbach 1999: 53; Radrizzani 1987: 196-7. 
24
 ,Q µGHWHUPLQLQJ MXGJHPHQW¶ D SDUWLFXODU LV VXEVXPHGXQGHU D JLYHQ µXQLYHUVDO¶ D FRQFHSWRU SULQFLSOH ,Q
µUHIOHFWLQJ MXGJHPHQW¶ QR XQLYHUVDO LV JLYHQ DQG WKH SRZHU RI MXGJHPHQW PXVW VHDUFK IRU D XQLYHUVDO XQGHU
which to subsume the particular. See Kant 2000: 66-8.  
25
 EPW: 155. SW, VI: 305. FNR: 34-7. SW, III: 35-38. 
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µFRJQLWLYH¶ UHFRJQLWLRQ²the cognitive act of picking out and identifying another rational being.26 
Cognitive recognition is intimately related to²indeed, entails²ZKDW ZH PLJKW FDOO µSUDFWLFDO¶
recognition. Fichte maintains that the cognitive recognition of another rational being involves 
understanding that one is under a rational obligaWLRQWRµWUHDW¶ (behandeln) that being in a certain way 
ZKHUHWKLVREOLJDWLRQLVµFRQWDLQHG¶LQWKHFRQFHSWRIDIUHHUDWLRQDOEHLQJ).27 To deliberate and act in 
accordance with this REOLJDWLRQ LV WR UHFRJQL]H WKDW EHLQJ µSUDFWLFDOO\¶28 An agent who cognitively 
UHFRJQL]HVDUDWLRQDOEHLQJZLOOLIµFRQVLVWHQW¶konsequent), recognize that being practically.29  
Fichte provides his most detailed treatment of recognition in his 1796-7 Foundations of 
Natural Right KHUHDIWHUµWKHFoundations¶. This work opens ZLWKWZRµGHGXFWLRQV¶RUWUDQVFHQGHQWDO
arguments: the µDeduction of the concept of rLJKW¶KHUHDIWHUµWKHILUVW'HGXFWLRQ¶DQGthe µDeduction 
of the applicability of the concept of rLJKW¶ KHUHDIWHU µWKH VHFRQG 'HGXFWLRQ¶ +HJHO¶V FULWLTXH
presupposes familiarity with the Deductions, and we will therefore spend some time discussing them.  
 
5HFRJQLWLRQDQGWKHµsXPPRQV¶ 
Fichte opens the first Deduction with the claim that self-consciousness necessarily involves the self-
ascription of a free, self-determining activity. In the case of human beings²µILQLWHUDWLRQDOEHLQJV¶²
the absolutely self-determining activity of the pure I is necessarily limited by a not-I or world. This 
limitatLRQHQJHQGHUVWZRW\SHVRIDFWLYLW\DµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO¶DFWLYLW\ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVDQRVWHQVLEO\
mind-LQGHSHQGHQW ZRUOG LQ DQ DSSDUHQWO\ SDVVLYH ZD\ D YROLWLRQDO µIUHH¶ DFWLYLW\ ZKLFK DLPV DW
µQXOOLI\LQJ >aufzuheben@¶ WKH REMHFWV WKDW FRPSRVH WKH ZRUOG µLQVRIDU DV WKH\ ELQG LW¶30 This free 
activity does not transform the world blindly; iWVHHNVWRWUDQVIRUPLWLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKµFRQFHSWVRI
HQGV¶WKDWLWKDVIUHHO\FRQVWUXFWHG,QVRIDUDVWKLVIUHHDFWLYLW\GHWHUPLQHVLWVHOIWRDFWLQDFFRUGDQFH
                                                          
26
 5DGUL]]DQLXVHVWKHWHUPµUHFRQQDLVVDQFHWKpRULTXH¶ to characterize the problem that Fichte is addressing. 
Radrizzani 1987: 195.  
27
 FNR: 48, 70, 79-80, 83-4. SW, III: 52, 75, 86, 90-1. 
28
 Redding DOVRGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQDQµHSLVWHPLF¶VHQVHRI)LFKWHDQUHFRJQLWLRQDQGDµSUDFWLFDO¶RUDVKH
puts it, µSHUIRUPDWLYH¶VHQVH5HGGLQJ-4. 
29
 FNR: 44, 46, 48. SW, III: 47, 49-50, 52. 
30
 FNR: 20. SW, III: 19. 
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with VXFK IUHHO\ IRUPHG FRQFHSWV LW LV D µVHOI-GHWHUPLQLQJ DFWLYLW\¶ )LFKWH FDOOV WKLV DFWLYLW\ µIUHH
HIILFDF\¶freie Wirksamkeit).31 
If a human being is to attain self-consciousness, it must ascribe free efficacy to itself. Now, we 
know that free efficacy is directed towards, and seeks to transform, a not-I or world. Consequently, the 
self-ascription of free efficacy presupposes the representation of a world. However, Fichte claims that 
a rational being can represent a world only if it is self-conscious and has thus already ascribed free 
HIILFDF\ WR LWVHOI )LFKWH¶V WKRXJKW SXW VLPSO\ LV WKDW WKH ZRUOG µVKRZV XS¶ IRU XV²is cognitively 
salient²only in virtue of our practical engagement with it). We thus seem to be caught in an impasse: 
the self-ascription of free efficacy presupposes the representation of a world, and the representation of 
a world presupposes the self-ascription of free efficacy. Fichte claims that we can exit this impasse if 
ZHFDQFRQFHLYHRIDVLWXDWLRQLQZKLFKWKHDJHQW¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDQREMHFWDVKHQRZSXWVLWDQG
WKHDJHQW¶VVHOI-DVFULSWLRQRIIUHHHIILFDF\DUHµV\QWKHWLFDOO\XQLILHG¶32 In such a situationWKHDJHQW¶V
representation of an object would necessarily involve the self-ascription of free-efficacy. However, 
this solution is problematic. An object is supposed to elicit WKHVXEMHFW¶VDZDUHQHVVRILWVIUHHHIILFDF\
However, according to Fichte, an essential characteristic of an object is that it determines a subject, 
that is, exerts an influence upon the subject that constrains and limits its free activity. This seems to be 
a contradiction. Fichte thinks that we can resolve this contradiction if we µFRQFHLYHRI WKH VXEMHFW¶V
being-determined as its being-determined to be self-determining, i.e. as a summons [eine 
Aufforderung] to the subject, calling upon it to resolve to H[HUFLVHLWVHIILFDF\¶33 In other words, the 
object must be such that it constrains or compels the subject to freely determine itself, and hence to 
manifest its free efficacy. 7KHREMHFWGRHVWKLVE\LVVXLQJDµVXPPRQV¶RUµLQYLWDWLRQ¶WRWKHVXEMHFWWR
H[HUFLVHLWVIUHHHIILFDF\DµGHPDQG¶Anforderung) that the subject act. In issuing the summons, the 
REMHFWSUHVHQWVWKHVXEMHFW¶VIUHHHIILFDF\WRLWDVVRPHWKLQJWREHUHDOL]HGRUDFKLHYHG,IWKHVXEMHFW
understands the summons, then it will realize its free efficacy: it will determine itself in accordance 
with an end that it has freely chosen and will ascribe this self-determination to itself.  
                                                          
31
 FNR: 18. SW, III: 17.  
32
 FNR: 31. SW, III: 32. 
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 7KH µREMHFW¶ WKDW LVVXHV WKH VXPPRQV LV FOHDUO\ DQRWKHU UDWLRQDO EHLQJ IRU RQO\ DQRWKHU
UDWLRQDO EHLQJ FRXOG SRVVHVV WKH FRQFHSW RI WKH VXEMHFW¶V IUHH HIILFDcy, set the concept of the 
realization of this efficacy as its end, and attempt to bring about the realization of that concept in the 
world.  
 Drawing on his account of reflecting judgement, Fichte argues that the addressee can 
understand the summons only on the assumption that its cause possesses the concepts of reason and 
IUHHGRP DQG KDV OLPLWHG LWV DFWLYLW\ LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK D FRQFHSW RI WKH DGGUHVVHH¶V SRWHQWLDO
freedom. Since the only being that can possess such concepts and act in such a way is a rational being, 
the addressee must infer that the cause of the summons is another rational being. This necessary 
inference furnishes us with a sure RUµXQPLVWDNHDEOH¶criterion for identifying another rational being: 
µ2QO\WKHPRGHUDWLRQRIIRUFHE\PHDQVof concepts is the unmistakeable and exclusive criterion of 
UHDVRQDQGIUHHGRP¶34 If this criterion is satisfied, then our recognition of another rational being is 
µFDWHJRULFDO¶. To recognize another rational being categorically is to judge that it is actually another 
rational being WKH PRGDOLW\ RI WKH MXGJHPHQW LV µDVVHUWRULF¶ on the basis of conclusive evidence. 
)LFKWHFRQWUDVWVVXFKµFDWHJRULFDO¶ UHFRJQLWLRQZLWKµSUREOHPDWLF¶ UHFRJQLWLRQ7RUHFRJQL]HDQRWKHU
UDWLRQDOEHLQJµSUREOHPDWLFDOO\¶LVWRMXGge that it is possible that it is a rational being.35  
In issuing the summons, the summoner restricts his freedom in accordance with the concept 
RIWKHUDWLRQDOLW\DQGIUHHGRPRIWKHDGGUHVVHHDQGWKHUHE\SURYLGHVWKHDGGUHVVHHZLWKDµVSKHUH¶RI
freedom in which to act. By freely choosing to realize one of the possibilities of action contained 
ZLWKLQWKLVVSKHUHWKHDGGUHVVHHDVFULEHVIUHHHIILFDF\WRLWVHOIDQGLVFRQVWLWXWHGDVDQµLQGLYLGXDO¶RU
µSHUVRQ¶²a free being that possesses a sphere of freedom.  
                                                          
34
 FNR: 43. SW, III: 45. 
35
 FNR: 41-44. SW, III: 43-47. A categorical judgement is a judgement in which a predicate is affirmed or 
denied of a subject. Fichte seems to use WKHWHUPµFDWHJRULFDO¶DVDV\QRQ\PIRU.DQW¶VµDVVHUWRULF¶6HH6:9
158. Compare GA, IV, I: 280-1 with Kant 1997: A75-76/B100-101. He might do this because the modal status 
of an assertoric judgement²actuality²can be expressed simply by emphasizing the copula in a categorical 
MXGJHPHQW HJ µWKDW is UHYHODWLRQ¶ 6: 9  By contrast, one has to use a modal adverb to express 
possibility or necessity. A problematic judgement is a judgement of modality which states that something is 
SRVVLEOHHJµWKDWmay EHUHYHODWLRQ¶6:9,QWKHHVVD\RQUHYHODWLRQ)LFKWHsuggests that we can 
be warranted in accepting a categorical judgement on probable grounds as well as conclusive ones. See SW, V: 
145. However, in the Foundations he is concerned with categorical judgements for which one has conclusive 
proof and which are therefore certain.  
My understanding of the categorical/problematic distinction is indebted to conversations with Gabe 
Gottlieb and to Gottlieb 2012 (unpublished manuscript). 
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 The summoner, by issuing the summons, proves or demonstrates that he is a rational being 
DQGUDWLRQDOO\FRPSHOVWKHDGGUHVVHH¶VFDWHJRULFDOUHFRJQLWLRQRIKLP7KHVXPPRQHUDOVRSURYHVWR
the addressee that he recognizes him as a rational being (because the summons is intelligible only on 
the assumption that it is addressed to a rational being). +RZHYHUWKHVXPPRQHU¶VUHFRJQLWLRQLVRQO\
µSUREOHPDWLF¶7KHVXPPRQHUUHVWULFWHGKLVIUHHGRPEHFDXVHKHMXGJHGLWpossible that the addressee 
is a rational EHLQJ7KHVXPPRQHU¶VSUREOHPDWLFUHFRJQLWLRQZLOOEHFRPHFDWHJRULFDO²that is, he will 
know for certain that the addressee is a rational being²only if the addressee restricts his freedom as a 
consequence of his recognition of the summoner. If the addressee does this he proves to the 
summoner that he is a rational being.36 ,IKHGRHVQ¶WWKHVXPPRQHULVHQWLWOHGWRFHDVHWUHDWLQJKLPDV
a rational being (because it is part of the concept of a rational being that it restricts its freedom on 
recognizing another rational being). Similarly, if the summoner should cease to treat the addressee as 
a rational being, the addressee is entitled to cease treating him as a rational being.  
 
1.4. Corporeal recognition 
In the second Deduction, Fichte deduces, in a series of transcendental arguments, the conditions of the 
possibility of the realization of the concept of right in the world. Fichte argues that if persons are to 
DFWIUHHO\LQWKHZRUOGWKH\PXVWDVFULEHDQµDUWLFXODWHG¶ERG\WRWhemselves, a body with a complex 
structure that permits an almost infinite variety of permutations. He further argues that the human 
body, and the world, must be posited as possessing certain features if subjects are to exert a non-
coercive influence on each other.  
 As well as deducing the conditions of the possibility of the realization of the concept of right, 
Fichte considers a possible objection to his account of the intersubjective conditions of self-
consciousness. In tackling this objection, Fichte answers a question that his account of the summons 
left unanswered: How, prior to the summons, does the summoner recognize the addressee of the 
summons as a rational being? 
7KHREMHFWLRQWXUQVRQWKHIDFWWKDW)LFKWH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHVXPPRQVVHHPVWRPDNHD human 
EHLQJ¶V DWWDLQPHQW RI VHOI-FRQVFLRXVQHVV DQG KHQFH UDWLRQDOLW\ GHSHQGHQW RQ WKH µIUHH FKRLFH¶ RU
                                                          
36
 FNR: 43. SW, III: 45. 
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µDUELWUDU\FKRLFH¶²WillkürDQGµJRRGZLOO¶RIDQRWKHU$KXPDQEHLQJFDQDWWDLQVHOI-consciousness 
only if he is summoned by another human being, but whether the summons occurs seems to depend 
wholly on the discretion of the latter. This picture has two features that might be thought problematic: 
first, it suggests that the emergence of self-consciousness and rationality is contingent²a matter of 
chance; second, it presents the summons as an asymmetrical relationship in which the addressee is 
wholly dependent and passive, while the summoner is wholly independent and active. As Fichte puts 
it, the account of the summons appears to make the summoned subjHFWLQWRWKHPHUHµDFFLGHQW¶RIWKH
summoning subject.37  
Fichte answers the objection by claiming that I (the potential addressee of the summons) exert 
an influence on the other agent such that he is compelled to cognitively recognize me as a rational 
being. Having done so, he LVREOLJHGE\µFRQVLVWHQF\¶WRpractically recognize me by summoning me 
to free interaction. This answers the objection by removing the problematic asymmetry and 
contingency of the summons. It removes the asymmetry because I exert an influence on the other 
DJHQWWRWKHH[WHQWWKDW,GRWKLVWKHRWKHUDJHQWFDQEHVDLGWREHµGHSHQGHQW¶RQPHLWUHPRYHVWKH
contingency because the other agent is compelled to cognitively recognize me and, insofar as he wills 
consistently, to issue the summons. 
The answer to the objection requires that I (the potential addressee) exert an influence on the 
other agent. At first glance, it is not clear how this is possible. For, as Fichte points out, I have not yet 
attained self-consciousness (since the summons has not taken place) and am therefore incapable of 
exercising my capacity for free efficacy. I therefore cannot act purposively in the world; indeed, 
Fichte claims that I cannot act at all. Given this, Fichte argues that the only possible source of 
influence is the shape and configuration of my body: 
 
my body would have to exercise an efficacy in virtue of its shape [Gestalt] and its mere 
existence in space; and indeed, it would have to exercise an efficacy such that every rational 
                                                          
37
 FNR: 69. SW, III: 74. Translation modified. 
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being would be obliged [verbunden wäre] to recognize me as a being capable of reason [der 
Vernunft fähiges] and to treat me in accordance with that presupposition.38  
 
$FFRUGLQJWR)LFKWHWKHKXPDQERG\µFRPSHOV¶ cognitive recognition (and, if the recognizing agent is 
consistent, its practical counterpart) because it can be fully comprehended only on the assumption that 
LWLVWKHERG\RIDUDWLRQDOEHLQJ)LFKWH¶VDUJXPHQWLQVXSSRUWRIWKLVFODLPUHOLHVDJDLQRQWKHFRQFHSW
of reflecting judgement, and turns on a contrast between the human body and the animal body. The 
DQLPDO ERG\ )LFKWH FODLPV FDQ EH WKRXJKW H[KDXVWLYHO\ XQGHU WKH FRQFHSW RI µGHWHUPLQDWH free 
movement¶DVSHFLHVRIµDUWLFXODWLRQ¶7RDWWULEXWHGHWHUPLQDWHIUHHPRYHPHQWWRVRPHWKLQJLVWRVD\
that whiOHLWLVFDSDEOHRIµDUELWUDU\PRYHPHQW¶RUµYROXQWDU\PRYHPHQW¶²willkürlichen Bewegung), 
the range of movement available to it is relatively constrained and limited.39 Although the human 
body can be thought under this concept, it is not exhausted by it. This is because the articulation of the 
KXPDQERG\XQOLNHWKDWRIWKHDQLPDOERG\KDVDQµLQILQLWHGHWHUPLQDELOLW\¶:KDW)LFKWHPHDQVE\
this is that the parts of the human body can, in contrast to the parts of the animal body, be combined, 
configured, and formed in a potentially limitless variety of ways. Whereas the configuration of the 
animal body is formed and fixed (a horse can walk only on all fours), the configuration of the human 
ERG\ LV KLJKO\ SODVWLF DQG IRUPDEOH 7KLV µIRUPDELOLW\¶ Bildsamkeit) can only be understood 
adequately, Fichte argues, under the concept of freedom (and rationality).  
 The concept of freedom at issue here is freedom as a radical capacity for self-determination. 
$ EHLQJ WKDW SRVVHVVHV VXFK IUHHGRP LV µLQILQLWHO\ GHWHUPLQDEOH¶ DQG SUHFLVHO\ EHFDXVH RI WKLV
µLQGHWHUPLQDWH¶40 $V)LFKWHSXWV LW µ(YHU\DQLPDO is what it is: only the human being is originally 
QRWKLQJDWDOO¶41 The body of such a being must, if it is to facilitate such self-determination, be itself 
µLQILQLWHO\ GHWHUPLQDEOH¶RUµIRUPDEOH¶)LFKWHLVQRWLWJRHVZLWKRXWVD\LQJFODLPLQJWKDWRQHFDQGR
                                                          
38
 FNR: 70. SW, III: 75. 
39
 FNR: 74. SW, III: 79. 
40
 FNR: 27. SW, III: 28. 
41
 FNR: 74. SW, III: 79-80. 
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just anything with the human body. He is claiming, rather, that the human body has a complex organic 
structure that permits an infinite variety of permutations that are within our volitional control.42  
 According to Fichte, then, the human body can be understood only DV WKH µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶
(Repräsentation)43 RUµSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶Darstellung)44 of a free, rational being in the sensible world. Any 
fully rational human being who perceives the shape of the human body will be compelled to 
cognitively UHFRJQL]HLWDVWKHERG\RIDEHLQJµFDSDEOHRIUHDVRQ¶&RQVHTXHQWO\KXPDQEHLQJVH[HUW
an influenFHRQHDFKRWKHUDQGµLQWHUDFW¶VLPSO\LQYLUWXHRIWKHLUFRUSRUHDOIRUP$V)LFKWHSXWVLW 
 
at the basis of all voluntarily chosen [willkürlichen] reciprocal interaction among free beings there 
lies an original and necessary reciprocal interaction among them, which is this: the free being, by 
his mere presence in the sensible world, compels every other free being, without qualification, to 
recognize him as a person.45 
 
Although Fichte does not say so explicitly, it seems that the recognition that is compelled by the shape 
RIWKHKXPDQERG\PXVWEHµSUREOHPDWLF¶UDWKHUWKDQµFDWHJRULFDO¶UHFRJQLWLRQ7KDWWKLVLVWKHFDVH
LVVXJJHVWHGE\)LFKWH¶VFODLPWKDW WKHUHFRJQLWLRQ LQTXHVWLRQ LVUHFRJQLWLRQRIDEHLQJµcapable of 
reason¶,WLVDOVRVXJJHVWHGE\WKHIDFWWKDW)LFKWHGHYHORSVKLVDFFRXQWRIµFRUSRUHDOUHFRJQLWLRQ¶WR
H[SODLQKRZWKHVXPPRQHU¶VSUREOHPDWLFUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHDGGUHVVHHLVSRVVLEOH 
 )LFKWH¶V DFFRXQW RI WKH DUWLFXODWHG ERG\ DV WKH µSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶ RI IUHHGRP LQ WKH ZRUOG PD\
seem to anticipate the conception of the body to be found in the work of phenomenologists such as 
Merleau-Ponty. However, a note of caution is in order. Although Fichte sometimes claims that the 
KXPDQERG\LV WKHµH[SUHVVLRQ¶RIUDWLRQDOLW\46, he conceives of the relationship between reason (or 
freedom) and the body as an instrumental relationship. Indeed, in the 1798 The System of Ethics, he 
GHVFULEHVWKHERG\DVWKHµWRRO¶RUµLQVWUXPHQW¶Werkzeug) of reason.47 The body is, so to speak, the 
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 FNR: 53-8. SW, III: 56-61. 
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 FNR: 71-2. SW, III: 76-7.  
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 FNR: 112. SW, III: 123. 
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 FNR: 79. SW, III: 85. 
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 See Fichte to Reinhold, 29th August, 1795. EPW: 408.  
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 SET: 71, 112. SW, IV: 69, 128.  
14 
 
tool with which reason transforms the world and is, like any tool, a means to an end. With this in 
PLQGZHFDQWXUQWR+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHRI)LFKWH. 
  
2 
In the Phenomenology Hegel describes the initial situation in which two individuals who seek 
recognition confront each other as follows:  
 
one individual is confronted by another individual. Appearing thus immediately, they exist for one 
another in the manner of ordinary objects; [they are] self-sufficient shapes [selbständige 
Gestalten], consciousnesses submerged in the being of life²for the existing object is here 
determined as life²which for each other have not yet accomplished the movement of absolute 
abstraction, of eradicating all immediate being, and of being merely the purely negative being of 
self-identical consciousness; in other words, they have not yet presented [dargestellt] themselves 
to each other in the form of pure being-for-self, i.e., as self-consciousnesses.48  
 
7KLV GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH LQLWLDO VLWXDWLRQ LV UHPLQLVFHQW RI WKH µRULJLQDO¶ encounter between Fichtean 
µLQGLYLGXDOV¶RUµSHUVRQV¶LQZKLFKHDFKLVFRPSHOOHGWRSUREOHPDWLFDOO\UHFRJQL]HWKHRWKHULQYLUWXH
RI WKH µVKDSH¶ Gestalt RI WKH RWKHU¶V ERG\ ,Q WKH YHUVLRQ RI WKLV DUJXPHQW LQ WKH Encyclopaedia, 
+HJHOQRWHVWKDWWKLVµLPPHGLDF\¶LVµDWWKHVDPHWLPHWKHERGLOLQHVV>RUµFRUSRUHDOLW\¶²Leiblichkeit] 
of self-consciousness in which, as in its sign and tool [Zeichen und Werkzeug], self-consciousness has 
its own self-feeling, as well as its being for others and its relation that mediates between itself and 
WKHP¶49 *LYHQ)LFKWH¶VFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQRI WKHERG\DV WKH Werkzeug of reason, and his account of 
corporeal recognition, it seems highly likely that Hegel has Fichte in mind in this version of the 
argument. 
2Q)LFKWH¶VDFFRXQWRf recognition, this initial encounter would rationally compel each agent 
WROLPLWKLVIUHHGRPWKURXJKWKHFRQFHSWRIWKHRWKHU¶VIUHHGRPWKHUHE\SURYLQJµFDWHJRULFDOO\¶to the 
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49
 EPS: §431. W, 10: 219-20. 
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other that he is free. The resulting relationship would be a pacific, symmetrical relationship of 
µUHFLSURFDO LQWHUDFWLRQ WKURXJK LQWHOOLJHQFH DQG IUHHGRP¶50 Fichte assumes that this relationship is 
HVWDEOLVKHGXQSUREOHPDWLFDOO\DQGZLWKRXWFRQIOLFW+HJHODVZHNQRZWKLQNVWKDWWKHµLQGLYLGXDOV¶
will be compelled to engage in a life and death struggle. The question we have to answer, then, is: 
+RZFRXOGWKLVSRVVLEO\EHDFULWLTXHRI)LFKWH¶VSRVLWLRQ" 
 
2.1 Immanent critique  
%HIRUH ZH DWWHPSW WR DQVZHU WKLV TXHVWLRQ D EULHI GLVFXVVLRQ RI +HJHO¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI FULWLTXH LV
necessary. +HJHO¶VPHWKRGRIFULWLFLVPLVµLQWHUQDO¶RUµLPPDQHQW¶51 7RVD\WKDWDFULWLTXHLVµLQWHUQDO¶
is to say that it judges the theory or µVKDSHRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶under consideration in terms of criteria 
or standards that are internal to it. The critique consists in showing that the attempt to satisfy these 
criteria or standards engenders an internal contradiction which can be resolved only by substantively 
revising the criteria or standards, or by abandoning them. The resolution of this contradiction leads to 
a richer, more adequate form of the theory or shape of consciousness. Hegel often refers to the new 
IRUPDV WKH µWUXWK¶RI LWV SUHGHFHVVRU or predecessors.52 Thus, in the Phenomenology, Hegel claims 
WKDW µSHUFHSWLRQ¶ LV WKH WUXWK RI µVHQVH-FHUWDLQW\¶ DQG WKDW µVHOI-FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ LV WKH WUXWK RI WKH
preceding shapes of consciousness.53  
 +HJHO¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI FULWLFLVP VKRXOG OHDG WR XV H[SHFW WKDW KLV FULWLTXH RI )LFKWH ZLOO EH
immanent and will engender a richer, more adequate form (or forms) of recognition.  
 
2.2. Recognition of Personality 
We can start to answer our question by considering a claim that Hegel makes when explaining the 
transition to the life and death struggle. He writes: 
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 FNR: 42. SW III: 44. 
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 See the Introduction to PhS. See Hegel 1969: 580-1. W, 6: 249-51. 
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 Inwood 1992: 300. 
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The individual who has not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not 
DWWDLQHGWRWKHWUXWKRIWKLVUHFRJQLWLRQ>RUµEHLQJ-UHFRJQL]HG¶²Anerkanntseins] as recognition of 
a self-sufficient self-consciousness.54  
 
This claim merits scrutiny. It identifies a specific form of recognition²recognition of the person²
and states that one can be recognized as a person without ULVNLQJRQH¶VOLIH+RZHYHULWWKHQDGGVWKDW
XQOHVV RQH KDV ULVNHG RQH¶V OLIH RQH ZLOO QRW DWWDLQ WR WKH WUXWK RI µthis being-UHFRJQL]HG¶ dieses 
Anerkanntseins) as recognition of D µVHOI-sufficient self-FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ ,I ZH UHDG µdieses 
Anerkanntseins¶ as referring to recognition of the person (as opposed to recognition tout court), then 
Hegel seems WREHFODLPLQJ WKDW WKHµWUXWK¶RI this form of recognition: a) is UHFRJQLWLRQDVD µVHOI-
sufficient self-FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶DQGEFDQEHDWWDLQHGRQO\LIRQHULVNVRQH¶VOLIH 
 To make full sense of this claim, we need to note that Hegel advances his own conception of 
UHFRJQLWLRQ RI WKH SHUVRQ RU DV , VKDOO KHQFHIRUWK UHIHU WR LW µUHFRJQLWLRQ RI SHUVRQDOLW\ 
[Persönlichkeit]¶7RUHFRJQL]HVRPHRQHDVDSHUVRQLVWRUHFRJQL]Hhim as possessing a µuniversal¶, 
rational nature; it is also to recognize him as DQDXWRQRPRXVµVHOI-VXIILFLHQW¶EHLQJ.55 This recognition 
involves the ascription of rights (especially the right of property) to the person. Now, as Franck 
Fischbach has argued, in the Phenomenology recognition of personality is realized fully only after a 
OHQJWK\ GLDOHFWLFDO GHYHORSPHQW ZKLFK SDVVHV WKURXJK WKH µVHUYLOH FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ µ6WRiFLVP¶ WKH
µ6WDWHRI/HJDOLW\¶RechtszustandDQGµ&XOWXUH¶Bildung).56 This means, of course, that recognition 
of personality is achieved only after the life and death struggle, and must, presumably, pass through it. 
Moreover, in the Encyclopaedia Hegel states that recognition of personality occurs only after the life 
and death struggle.57 Given all of WKLV+HJHO¶VFODLPWKDWRQHFDQEHUHFRJQL]HGDVDµSHUVRQ¶without 
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ULVNLQJRQH¶VOLIH is extremely puzzling. As far as I am aware, the puzzling nature of this claim has 
received no attention in the literature. 
 The puzzle arises from the assumption that the phrase µEHUHFRJQL]HGDVDperson¶ refers to 
+HJHO¶V conception of recognition of personality²the conception that results from the dialectical 
development. This puzzle is solved if we take the phrase to refer to )LFKWH¶V conception of 
recognition, and, moreover, DVVXPH WKDW WKLV FRQFHSWLRQ LV WKH PRVW µLPPHGLDWH¶ DQG LPSRYHULVKHG
form of recognition of personality. If we read the phrase in this way, then Hegel is claiming that while 
one can obtain Fichtean recognition²the recognition outlined in the Foundations²without risking 
RQH¶VOLIHRQHFDQnot attain to the µtruth¶ RIWKDWUHFRJQLWLRQDVUHFRJQLWLRQRIDµself-sufficient self-
FRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ZLWKRXWULVNLQJRQH¶VOLIH,WVHHPVSODXVLEOHWRWKLQNWKDWWKHµWUXWK¶RIWKDWUHFRJQLWLRQ
will be the form of recognition of personality that results from the dialectical development: Hegelian 
recognition of personality.  
 This interpretation VXJJHVWVWKDW+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHLVDVIROORZV Fichte¶VDFFRXQWRIrecognition 
aims to explain how the cognitive and practical recognition of individuals as free, self-sufficient 
EHLQJV LV SRVVLEOH 7KLV UHFRJQLWLRQ LV WKH µWUXWK¶ that Fichtean individuals DQG )LFKWH¶V DFFRXQW 
aspire to. The account of recognition offered in the Foundations does not allow individuals to attain 
that truth. They can attain that truth only if they pass through the life and death struggle.  
  
2.3 The transition to the life and death struggle 
This provides only the beginning of an answer to our question, for it does not explain why Hegel 
thinks that Fichtean individuals must engage in a life and death struggle if they are to attain to the 
µtruth¶ RIUHFRJQLWLRQRISHUVRQDOLW\,QRUGHUWRH[SODLQWKLVZHQHHGWRFRQVLGHU+HJHO¶VDFFRXQWRI
the transition to the life and death struggle.  
On one interpretation of the transition, individuals are compelled to engage in the life and 
death struggle because their underlying practical attitude is that of µdesire¶ Begierde).58 Each 
individual seeks to ratify his sense of himself as a free, self-sufficient being by completely 
subordinating the other to his will, just as, in the dialectic of desire, he sought to subordinate objects 
                                                          
58
 See Stern 2002: 76. 
18 
 
to his will by negating them. The attempt of each individual to subordinate the other to his will 
engenders a life and death struggle. The defect of this interpretation, as Stern points out, is that it fails 
to do justice to the idea that recognition is the source of conflict.59  
A second interpretation holds that the life and death struggle arises because each individual 
wants to be recognized by the other, but does not want to recognize him in turn. The defect of this 
interpretation, as Stern again points out, LVWKDWLWVHHVULVNLQJRQH¶VOLIHDVDµVLGH-HIIHFW¶RIWKHOLIH
and death struggle rather than as the reason for it. As Hegel makes clear, the life and death struggle 
occurs because individuals are FRPSHOOHG WR ULVN WKHLU OLYHV DQG WR VHHN HDFK RWKHU¶V GHDWK A 
satisfactory interpretation RI WKH WUDQVLWLRQ PXVW WKHUHIRUH DQVZHU WKH IROORZLQJ TXHVWLRQ µ:hy are 
individuals compelled to risk their lives for recognition?¶ 
A third interpretation²outlined by Stern²answers this question as follows.60 Each individual 
is compelled to risk his life because the other can be expected to treat him as a self-sufficient, free 
being only if the other knows for certain that he is such a being. In order to ensure that the other has 
VXFK NQRZOHGJH WKH LQGLYLGXDO PXVW SUHVHQW KLPVHOI DV D µSXUH EHLQJ-for-VHOI¶. However, the 
individual appears to the other as a natural being, a being that is submerged LQ DQG µDWWDFKHG WR¶ 
µOLIH¶DQGWKLVDSSHDUDQFe is incompatible with the µpresentation¶Darstellung) of the individual as a 
µpure being-for-VHOI¶7KHLQGLYLGXDOFDQµSURYH¶WRWKHRWKHUWKDWKHLVVXFKDEHLQJRQO\E\µVKRZLng 
that it is not attached to any determinate existence>«@that LWLVQRWDWWDFKHGWROLIH¶61 The individual 
can only do this, Hegel claims, by risking his life by seeking the death of the other.62  
At first glance, it is not clear why the individual must risk his life by seeking the death of the 
other, for surely the individual could risk his life, and prove himself to be free, in other ways (e.g., by 
playing Russian roulette in front of the other).63 The reason why the individual must risk his life by 
seeking the death of the other is that the individual himself requires conclusive proof that the other is 
free. In other words, the individual needs to know for certain that the embodied being confronting him 
is the sort of being that is capable of treating him as a rational being (and which should be treated as a 
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rational being). By seeking the death of the other, the individual both proves that he is a free, self-
VXIILFLHQWEHLQJDQGµWHVWV¶WKHRWKHUWo see if he is such a being.64  
+RZGRHVVHHNLQJWKHGHDWKRIWKHRWKHUFRQVWLWXWHDµWHVW¶"(DFKLQGLYLGXDO¶VDLPLQWU\LQJWR
kill the other, is to elicit a response that would SURYLGHFRQFOXVLYHSURRIRIWKHRWKHU¶V freedom and 
self-sufficiency. Such a UHVSRQVHLVSURYLGHGE\WKHRWKHU¶VZLOOLQJULVNRIKLVOLIH, for it demonstrates 
that he is not attached to his corporeal, natural existence; it shows that there is nothing which he could 
QRWUHJDUGµDVDYDQLVKLQJPRPHQW¶65 In Fichtean language, one could say that the risk of life is the 
µunmistakeable and exclusive criterion¶ of freedom and self-sufficiency. According to Hegel, the 
combatants initially interpret the criterion in such a way that it can only be satisfied by death: the 
freely willed death of the other provides incontrovertible proof that he risked his life and was not 
attached to sensuous existence. As Hegel puts it in the EncyclopaediaµThe absolute proof [absolute 
Beweis] of freedom in the struggle for recognition is death¶.66 Obviously, this µSURRI E\ GHDWK¶
(Bewährung >«@durch den Tod) would render recognition impossible by eliminating one or both of 
the combatants.67 Faced with the possibility of death, the combatants UHDOL]HWKDWµOLIH¶ is as µHVVHQWLDO¶
as µSXUH self-consciousness¶ and revise their interpretation of the criterion so that its satisfaction is 
compatible with their embodied existence.68 In so doing, they enter the relationship of Mastery and 
Servitude. 
What is interesting²indeed, surprising²about this interpretation is that it suggests that the 
life and death struggle is motivated by epistemic concerns.69 Indeed, one could say, on the basis of this 
interpretation, that the struggle for recognition is a struggle for epistemic recognition. Individuals do 
not risk their lives because of an overweening sense of their own importance or because they desire to 
subordinate the other to their will. They risk their lives because they need to prove that they are free 
and require proof that the other is free. Such proof, Hegel claims, can be provided only by the risk of 
life.  
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 This interpretation VXJJHVWV WKDW +HJHO¶V FULWLTXH LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK )LFKWH¶V epistemic 
conception of recognition. As we have seen, RQ)LFKWH¶VDFFRXQWRIUHFRJQLWLRQDQ individual proves 
conclusively that he is free²and thereby justifies the categorical judgement that he is free²when he 
OLPLWV KLV IUHHGRP LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH FRQFHSW RI DQRWKHU LQGLYLGXDO¶V IUHHGRP µRQO\ WKH
moderation of force by means of concepts is the unmistakeable and exclusive criterion of reason and 
IUHHGRP¶70 $FFRUGLQJ WR +HJHO )LFKWH¶V FULWHULRQ LV IODZHG WKH XQPLVWDNHDEOH DQG H[FOXVLYH
criterion of reason and freedom is WKH ULVN RI RQH¶V life. If a Fichtean individual is to prove 
conclusively that he is free, and is to acquire categorical knowledge that the other is free, he must 
engage in a life and death struggle. Since the provision of such proof is a necessary condition of being 
recognized categorically as a free, self-sufficient being, Hegel can claim that a Fichtean individual 
FDQQRWDWWDLQWRWKHµWUXWK¶RIWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRISHUVRQDOLW\ZLWKRXWULVNLQJhis life. 
7KLV H[SODLQV KRZ +HJHO¶V DFFRXQW RI WKH OLIH DQG GHDWK VWUXJJOH FDQ EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV D
FULWLTXH RI )LFKWH¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI recognition. However, it does not yet explain how it can be 
interpreted as an immanent critique of that conception. )RUZK\FDQ¶W)LFKWHVLPSO\GHQ\ZKDW+HJHO
asserts? If the life and death struggle is to be interpreted as in immanent critique of Fichte, Hegel must 
be able to argue that FHUWDLQ IHDWXUHVRI)LFKWH¶VSRVLWLRQcommit him, malgré lui, to accepting the 
claim that the only criterion of freedom and self-VXIILFLHQF\ LV ULVNLQJ RQH¶V OLIH Hegel does not, 
unfortunately, provide such an argument, and we will therefore have to construct one on his behalf. 
We can start to do this by providing an explanation of why, according to Hegel, the only possible 
FULWHULRQRIIUHHGRPLVULVNLQJRQH¶VOLIH 
According to Stern, the reason why ULVNLQJRQH¶VOLIHis the only criterion is that the life and 
death struggle takes place in a primitive social condition in which individuals lack alternative ways of 
demonstrating their freedom. In the absence of social roles which allow them to express, and thereby 
demonstrate, their freedom, the only way in which individuals can prove their freedom is by risking 
their lives.71  
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This explanation has a certain plausibility and receives some support from +HJHO¶VDFFRXQWRI
the life and death struggle in the Encyclopaedia. However, as Stern points out, it makes the necessity 
of the transition a function of contingent historical circumstances and this is µXQVDWLVIDFWRU\¶ insofar as 
the dialectic of the Phenomenology has, until now, been µdriven by some sort of conceptual one-
VLGHGQHVVRUWHQVLRQ¶72 A more satisfactory explanation would explain the QHFHVVLW\RISURYLQJRQH¶V
IUHHGRPE\ULVNLQJRQH¶VOLIHDVUHVXOWLQJIURPDQLPSRYHULVKHGRUOLPLWHGconception of freedom.  
I think that such an explanation is available. In the accounts of the life and death struggle in 
the Philosophical Propaedeutic, Hegel suggests that the parties to the struggle have an impoverished 
FRQFHSWLRQRIIUHHGRPDVFRQVLVWLQJVROHO\LQµDEVWUDFWLRQIURPQDWXUDOH[LVWHQFH¶73 RUµfreedom from 
sensuous existence¶74 +HJHOFDOOVWKLVFRQFHSWLRQRIIUHHGRPµQHJDWLYHIUHHGRP¶ It seems plausible 
to think that the nature of the criterion of freedom, and of the corresponding proof, are determined by 
this conception of freedom. In other words, it is because individuals, at this stage of the dialectic, 
FRQFHLYHRIIUHHGRPDVµQHJDWLYHIUHHGRP¶WKDWWKHonly SURRIRIIUHHGRPLVULVNLQJRQH¶VOLIH  
 This conception of freedom is not, it should be noted, the exclusive preserve of individuals 
existing in a primitive condition. It is also expressed, in a rarefied and abstract form, in )LFKWH¶V
transcendental philosophy. Indeed, Hegel first introduces the term µQHJDWLYHIUHHGRP¶ in his critique 
of Fichte in the 1801 7KH 'LIIHUHQFH %HWZHHQ )LFKWH¶V DQG 6FKHOOLQJ¶V 6\VWHP RI 3KLORVRSK\ 
KHUHDIWHUWKHµDifferenzschrift¶. In that work, Hegel argues that Fichte is committed to a conception 
of freedom²negative freedom²that creates insuperable difficulties for his system of transcendental 
philosophy. 7KLV VXJJHVWV WKDW +HJHO¶V LPPDQHQW FULWLTXH will consist in the claim that )LFKWH¶V
conception of freedom²a conception that is fundamental to his system of freedom²entails that the 
only µXQPLVWDNHDEOH¶FULWHULRQRIIUHHGRPLVULVNLQJRQH¶VOLIH,QRUGHUWRprovide the resources with 
which to construct an argument in support of this claimDGLVFXVVLRQRI+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHRI)LFKWHLQ
the Differenzschrift is necessary.   
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2.4 Negative Freedom 
In §1.1, we discussed the nature of the Fichtean µSXUH,¶:HVDZWKDWit is essentially free, which is to 
VD\ WKDW LW LVFRPSOHWHO\ µVHOI-GHWHUPLQLQJ¶ µLQGHWHUPLQDWH¶DQG µVHOI-VXIILFLHQW¶1RZ)LFKWHRIWHQ
characterizes the pure I LQ FRQWUDGLVWLQFWLRQ WR WKH µQRW-,¶ RU QDWXUH 7KH SXUH , DQG WKH QRW-I are 
presented as having opposed and mutually exclusive characteristics. The pure I is characterized as 
µVSRQWDQHLW\¶µVHOI-DFWLYLW\¶µDJLOLW\¶AgilitätDQGµPRELOLW\¶Beweglichkeit).75 The not-I or nature 
LVFKDUDFWHUL]HGDVSDVVLYHOLIHOHVVDQGLQHUWµ7KHQDWXUHRIDWKLQJ¶)LFKWHZULWHVµOLHVLQLWVIL[HG
subsistence, lacking any inner movement, passive and dead.'76 On one occasion, Fichte explicitly 
assimilates the opposition between the I and not-I to the opposition between life and death.77 In his 
explanation of raGLFDO HYLO )LFKWH DWWULEXWHV D µIRUFH RI LQHUWLD¶ Kraft der Trägheit) to nature, a 
capacity to resist the activity of reason.78 Finally, he characterizes the I and not-I in terms of the 
opposition between indeterminacy and determinacy. If the I is indeterminate, the not-I (or nature) is 
wholly determinate: its nature is fixed and unchanging.79   
In the Differenzschrift Hegel argues that Fichte is committed to a conception of freedom that 
threatens the coherence of his system of transcendental philosophy. HeJHOFDOOVWKLVIUHHGRPµQHJDWLYH
IUHHGRP¶RUµIUHHGRPUHJDUGHGIURPWKHVWDQGSRLQWRIUHIOHFWLRQ¶80  
7KHµVWDQGSRLQWRIUHIOHFWLRQ¶WUHDWV WKHSKHQRPHQDWKDWLWFRQVLGHUVLQWHUPVRIRSSRVLWLRQV
such as inner and outer, subject and object, pure self and empirical self, I and not-I, freedom and 
nature.81 It conceives of these oppositions as hard and fast, mutually exclusive, oppositions²as 
µDEVROXWHRSSRVLWHV¶82 ,WLVWREHFRQWUDVWHGZLWKDQGLVµVXEODWHG¶E\WKHVWDQGSRLQWRIµVSHFXODWLRQ¶
+HJHO¶VVWDQGSRLQWZKLFKVHHNVWRFRPSUHKHQGWKHRSSRVHGWHUPVLQWKHLULQQHUXQLW\RUµLGHQWLW\¶
ZKLOHUHFRJQL]LQJWKHLUGLIIHUHQFH)LFKWH¶VV\VWHPLVDSULPHH[DPSOHRIWKHµVWDQGSRLQWRIUHIOHFWLRQ¶
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since, as we have just seen, it characterizes the pure I (or freedom) and the not-I (or nature) in terms 
of pairs of fundamentally opposed and mutually exclusive qualities.  
$FFRUGLQJ WR+HJHOµIUHHGRPLV WKHFKDUDFWHULVWLFPDUN>Charakter@RI UDWLRQDOLW\¶DQGµWKH
VXPPLW RI )LFKWH¶V V\VWHP¶83 However, he argues that Fichte conceives of freedom in an 
LPSRYHULVKHG ZD\ DV µVRPHWKLQJ PHUHO\ QHJDWLYH QDPHO\ DEVROXWH LQGHWHUPLQDF\ >RU
µLQGHWHUPLQDWHQHVV¶²Unbestimmtheit@¶84 7RFRQFHLYHRI IUHHGRPDV µLQGHWHUPLQDF\¶ LV WRFRQFHLYH
of it as a capacity to abstract from, and negate, any determinate features or characteristics. To 
conceive of freedom as absolute indeterminacy is to conceive of it as completely incompatible with²
as excluding²determinacy. If one conceives of freedom in this way, then one will also conceive of it 
as incompatible with any limitation, since to limit something is to determine it. Consequently, 
IUHHGRP RQ WKLV FRQFHSWLRQ LV WKDW ZKLFK µLQ LWVHOI DEROLVKHV DOO OLPLWDWLRQ¶85 Such freedom is 
DSSURSULDWHO\FKDUDFWHUL]HGDVµQHJDWLYH¶EHFDXVHLWLVWKHnegation of what it is not: determinacy and 
limitation.   
Fichte has to conceive of freedom in this way because determinacy and limitation are 
essential characteristics of the not-I or nature, and the I and not-I are absolutely opposed. In other 
words, this conception of freedom is entailed by the exclusionary logic of the µVWDQGSRLQW RI
UHIOHFWLRQ¶ 7KLV H[FOXVLRQDU\ ORJLF DOVR FRPSHOV )LFKWH WR FRQFHLYH RI WKH QRW-I or nature in an 
LPSRYHULVKHGZD\+HUH+HJHOSLFNVXSRQDQGH[SORLWV)LFKWH¶VFKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQVRI WKHQRW-I or 
nature as lifeless, fixed, and completely determinate. Fichte, Hegel asserts, presents nature as an 
µDEVROXWH HIIHFW DQG DV GHDG¶86 DV µVRPHWKLQJ HVVHQWLDOO\ GHWHUPLQDWH >RU µGHWHUPLQHG¶²ein 
wesentlich Bestimmtes@DQG OLIHOHVV¶87 This impoverished conception of nature is a consequence of 
WKHµDEVROXWHRSSRVLWLRQ¶EHWZHHQQDWXUHDQGIUHHGRP,IRQHFKDUDFWHUL]HVWKHIUHHGRPRIWKHSXUH,
in terms of spontaneity, agility, and mobility, and one thinks that freedom is absolutely opposed to 
nature, then one has to conceive of nature as dead, fixed, and completely determinate.  
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A crucial, and obvious, XSVKRWRI)LFKWH¶VµDEVROXWHRSSRVLWLRQ¶EHWZHHQIUHHGRPDQGQDWXUH
is that freedom can be realized, or manifested, LQWKHZRUOGRQO\DWWKHµH[SHQVH¶RIQDWXUHRUWKHQRW-I. 
,I IUHHGRP LVFRQFHLYHGRIDV µDEVROXWH LQGHWHUPLQDF\¶ WKHQ LWV UHDOL]DWLRQHQWDLOV WKHQHJDWLRQDQG
elimination of that which is determinate and fixed. Freedom, so conceived, cannot be expressed 
adequately in specific social institutions or character traits, since these are necessarily determinate and 
specific. Nor, for that matter, can freedom be expressed adequately by the human body. As we have 
seen, Fichte claims that the human body is LQ YLUWXH RI LWV µLQILQLWH GHWHUPLQDELOLW\¶ the 
µUHSUHVHQWDWLon¶RU µSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶RI  freedom in the world. In the Differenzschrift, Hegel points out 
that this conception of the body as the representation of freedom is not available to Fichte given the 
underlying logic of his position. The body is, as Fichte acknowledges, posited in opposition to the 
pure I; consequently, it must possess the characteristics of the not-I. $V+HJHOSXWV LW WKHSXUH ,¶V
µconnection with this sphere is merely a having. The basic character of nature is to be a world of the 
organic being, an absolute opposite; the essence of nature is atomistic lifelessness >«@¶88  
 
2.5 +HJHO¶VFULWLTXHRI)LFKWH 
The Differenzschrift SURYLGHVXVZLWKWKHUHVRXUFHVZLWKZKLFKWRFRQVWUXFWDQDUJXPHQWRQ+HJHO¶V
behalf and, in so doing, to provide a definitive answer to our question: How cRXOG+HJHO¶VDFFRXQWRI 
WKHOLIHDQGGHDWKVWUXJJOHSRVVLEO\EHDFULWLTXHRI)LFKWH¶VSRVLWLRQ" 
Two Fichtean LQGLYLGXDOVFRQIURQWHDFKRWKHUDVHPERGLHGEHLQJVLPPHUVHGLQµOLIH¶(DFKLV
FRPSHOOHGLQYLUWXHRIWKHVKDSHRIWKHRWKHU¶VERG\WRUHFognize him problematically as a potentially 
free being. Each desires to interact with the other, because he believes that the other is the kind of 
object that is able to ratify and confirm his sense of himself as a free being. However, prior to such 
interaction, each individual requires conclusive, µcategorical¶ proof that the other is a free being. The 
QDWXUHRI WKLVSURRIZLOO DVZHKDYHQRWHGGHSHQGXSRQHDFK LQGLYLGXDO¶V FRQFHSWLRQRI IUHHGRP
1RZLI+HJHO¶VFULWLTXHLQWKHDifferenzschrift is correct, Fichtean individuals conceive of freedom as 
µQHJDWLYH IUHHGRP¶ WKDW LV WKH\ FRQFHLYH RI IUHHGRP solely as absolute indeterminacy²as the 
abolition of any limit. They also conceive of nature, and hence the body, as absolutely opposed to 
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freedom: as completely determinate, ossified, and lifeless. As Hegel puts it in the account of the life 
and death struggle LQ WKH  µ'RFWULQH RI &RQVFLRXVQHVV IRU WKH 0LGGOH &ODVV¶ LQ WKH 
Philosophical Propaedeutic, µBeing is the not-I, inertia, not self-determination [Sein ist das Nichtich, 
Trägheit, nicht Selbstbestimmung.].¶89  
Given this conception of freedom, conclusive, categorical proof that an individual is free 
cannot, pace Fichte, be provided by the µPRGHUDWLRQRIIRUFH¶LQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKconcepts²that is, 
by the limitation of freedom. However, freedom could be proven categorically if it could somehow be 
shown that an individual is willing to completely negate that which is opposed to, and limits, his 
freedom, namely, his corporeal, natural existence.  
,Q )LFKWH¶V DFFRXQW RI UHFRJQLWLRQ WKH act of issuing the summons constitutes a test of the 
freedom and rationality of the addressee, and proves categorically that the summoner is a free, rational 
being. If Hegel is correct, then, as )LFKWH¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIIUHHGRPHQWDLOVDYHU\GLIIHUHQWcriterion of 
freedom and rationality, it follows that it requires a very different test. In order to test whether the 
other individual is a completely free and self-sufficient being, a µpure being-for-self¶, each agent must 
VHHNµthe death of the other¶.90 Insofar as each agent does this, he risks his own life and proves that he 
is a free being. 7KHLUHQLFJHVWXUHRIWKHµVXPPRQV¶LVWKHUHIRUHUHSODFHGE\WKHEHOOLJHUHQWSXUVXLWRI
WKHRWKHU¶VGHDWK 
As we saw in the first part of this paper ()LFKWH¶VDFFRXQWRIUHFRJQLWLRQis motivated 
E\DµSUDFWLFDO¶FRQFHUQZLWKWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RI.DQWLDQPRUDODQGSROLWLFDOWKHRU\,IWKHprinciples 
of Kantian moral and political theory are to be applicable, we must be able to recognize other 
µSHUVRQV¶, that is, other free, µVHOI-VXIILFLHQW¶ beings +HJHO¶V FULWLTXH LI VXFFHVVIXO VKRZV WKDW 
)LFKWH¶V account of recognition in the Foundations does not²given his conception of freedom and 
self-sufficiency²furnish an unmistakeable criterion for recognizing other persons as self-sufficient 
beings. )LFKWH¶V FRQFHSWLRQ of freedom entails a very different criterion which, when applied, 
HQJHQGHUV D YLROHQW VWUXJJOH WKDW LV LQLPLFDO WR PRUDOLW\ DQG ODZ )LFKWH¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI IUHHGRP
therefore undermines, paradoxically, the coherence of KLV µV\VWHP RI IUHHGRP¶ 7R ensure the 
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coherence of his system, Fichte must revise and deepen his conception of freedom and self-
sufficiency. Such a revision and deepening takes place in the subsequent stages of the 
Phenomenology. The parties to the life and death struggle realize that their embodied existence is as 
important as freedom, and the servant learns²through work²that freedom can be expressed and 
manifested in nature. It is only after a lengthy process of development that passes through µ6WRLFLVP¶
the µ6WDWH RI /HJDOLW\¶ DQG µ&XOWXUH¶ WKDW LQGLYLGXDOV DFTXLUH DQ DGHTXDWH FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKHLU VHOI-
sufficiency and IUHHGRP,I)LFKWHDQµSHUVRQV¶DUH WRDWWDLQWKHµWUXWK¶RIUHFRJQLWLRQRISHUVRQDOLW\
they must undergo this process of development and must, therefore, pass through the life and death 
struggle.91 
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